Effective number of candidates and regional wealth in campaign finance analyses: A methodological proposal for comparing the effects of the monetization of election campaigns in Brazil by Urizzi Cervi, Emerson
REB
REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS BRASILEÑOS
REB. REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS BRASILEÑOS   I   PRIMER SEMESTRE 2015   I   VOLUMEN 2 - NÚMERO 2
63
Effective number of candidates and 
regional wealth in campaign finance 
analyses: A methodological proposal for 
comparing the effects of the monetization 
of election campaigns in Brazil
Número de candidatos y desarrollo regional en análisis de financiación de campañas: 
una propuesta metodológica para comparar los efectos de la monetización de las 
campañas electorales en Brasil
Número efetivo de candidatos e desenvolvimento regional em análises de 
financiamento de campanhas: uma proposta metodológica para comparar os efeitos 
da monetarização das campanhas eleitorais no Brasil
AUTOR
Emerson Urizzi 
Cervi*
ecervi7@gmail.com
* Doutor em Ciência 
Política; professor 
adjunto da Universidade 
Federal do Paraná
ABSTRACT
This paper is an empirical study to measure the impact of financial resources on election 
campaigns. As Brazil is a large country with economically, politically and socially heterogeneous 
electoral districts, it is difficult to make direct comparisons regarding the impact of campaign 
financing on national elections. The study sets out by assuming that campaign resources have 
different effects depending on the levels of political competitiveness and local wealth. The aim 
of the study is to propose a model that will allow different campaign situations to be put on the 
same level in order to conduct a comparative evaluation of the impacts that financial resources 
make on elections. For this purpose, the data for the 2010 elections for Federal Deputy will be 
used.
RESUMEN 
El trabajo presenta estudio empírico sobre el efecto de los recursos financieros en los resultados electorales. 
En Brasil, debido a que es un país de grandes extensiones y heterogeneidad económica, política y social en 
los distritos electorales, las comparaciones directas son difíciles. Se parte del princpio de que los recursos 
de campaña tienen pesos diferentes en función de los niveles de la competición politica y de la riqueza 
regional. Tenemos la intención de proponer un modelo que permite igualar las diferentes condiciones de 
campaña para evaluar los impactos de los recursos financieros en las disputas. Para ello, hemos utilizado 
los datos sobre las elecciones de 2010 para diputado federal.
RESUMO 
O artigo apresenta um estudo empírico sobre dos recursos financeiros em resultados eleitorais em 
democracia de massa. No caso do Brasil, por se tratar de um País de grandes extensões e heterogeneidade 
econômica, política e social nos distritos eleitorais, as comparações diretas são difíceis. Parte-se do 
princípio que recursos de campanha têm peso distinto em função dos níveis de concorrência política e da 
riqueza regional. Pretende-se propor um modelo que permita a equalizar distintas condições de campanha 
para avaliar os impactos dos recursos financeiros nas disputas. Para tanto, serão usados dados referentes 
às eleições de 2010 para Deputado Federal..
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1. Introduction
Studies of election results are among the most explored fields of political science when it comes to 
interpreting the complex elements of representative democracy. As has already been pointed out 
by Taagepera and Shugart (1989), these studies look at well defined and measureable numbers 
of votes, seats and candidates in order to arrive at more complex notions of the system as a 
whole. More recently, the measurable values of campaign finance resources have been added to 
the number of votes1. Figure 1 below shows the relationship between funds raised individually 
and the votes obtained by over four thousand candidates for federal deputy in Brazil during the 
2010 elections. The coefficient of determination (r2) of 0.700 shows a strong relationship between 
money and votes. The more resources available, the greater the possibility of winning individual 
votes. This does not mean that money ensures victory, as there are socio-political factors other 
than economic ones that can account for how an election is won.
Following the hints of a strong relationship between money and votes, Figure 2 below shows the 
same variable relationships. However, the colors distinguish the candidates of each of the Brazilian 
meso-regions. It shows that, even when the 27 electoral districts are viewed as five meso-regions, 
differences remain in the relationship between campaign donations and individual votes. For the 
northern region of the country, the r2 is 0.661; for the north-east, the r2 is 0.732; in the mid-west, 
the r2 is 0.642; in the south-east, the r2 is 0.713, and in the south, the r2 is 0.747. The coefficients 
show that the degree of explanation of the region among the variables varies from one group 
to another. It is because of these differences that we will use two variables, one political and one 
economic, to compose an index for minimizing the regional effects of the impact of monetary 
resources on election campaigns and therefore improve the conditions for comparing them.
Figure 1 - Relationship between money raised (R$) and individual votes obtained for federal deputy in the 2010 elections in Brazil2
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If the distribution of cases allows us to identify the 
differences between macro-regions, Figure 3 shows 
the coefficients of determination by electoral 
district, which is indeed the point in question. Here 
the differences are shown concerning the strength 
of the relationship between the two variables by 
electoral district, varying from an r2 of over 0.800 
for the state of Paraíba and an r2 of just over 0.400 in 
Acre. In addition to revealing the magnitude of the 
differences in the relationships between campaign 
resources and number of votes, the graph also 
shows the low utility of analyzing the relationships 
between variables by the aggregate of the meso-
regions, since electoral districts in the same region 
assume different positions in the graph. For 
example, the three largest coefficients, Paraíba, 
Minas Gerais and Ceará, belong to different regions: 
the north, south-east and north-east, respectively. 
These initial “findings” enable us to conclude that 
drawing direct comparisons between the effect of 
financing and votes among candidates of different 
Brazilian states is not recommended, even when 
the election is for the same post and follows the 
same rules.
Analyses of election campaign donations and 
donors have proved to be highly productive when 
the aim is to understand the hitherto overlooked 
contextual aspects of elections (La Raja, 2014; 
Hooge et al, 2006; Mann, 1999; Scarrow, 2004; 
Fisher, 2004). Furthermore, the empirical treatment 
of election results, with mathematical analysis and 
the creation of indices, is increasingly being used as 
a research tool. According to Peña, 
the data on voting and seats allocated to 
each party have enabled us to add simple 
indicators that are intended to explain the 
distributions and differences observed in a 
single datum (2005, p. 235, translated from 
the original Spanish).
The issue is to identify how far simple indicators that 
overlook the particular aspects of electoral systems 
can be reproduced when seeking to generalize the 
results. To what extent are gains in comparability 
greater than the representation of the particular 
aspects of each election? Is it possible to find 
campaign effects that are effectually comparable 
Figure 2 - Relationship between funds raised (R$) and individual votes by Brazilian regions for federal deputy in 2010
REB. REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS BRASILEÑOS   I   PRIMER SEMESTRE 2015   I   VOLUMEN 2 - NÚMERO 2
66
  EMERSON URIZZI CERVI  
in electoral districts with contextual differences? 
Brazilian national elections, which are held in 27 
electoral districts simultaneously, are a suitable 
object of analysis for seeking the answers to these 
questions.
The aim of this paper is to test the impact of financial 
resources on votes relative to two variables: the 
level of competition for each seat and the economic 
wealth of each electoral district. The former is 
related to the ability of the political elite to field 
candidates to run for office3. As the effective number 
of candidates varies from one district to another, 
we consider any comparison of the effects of 
campaign resources that overlooks the differences 
in the number of effective candidates as being 
inadequate to the task. As the maximum number of 
candidates permitted by law is proportional to the 
number of voters, in districts with a lower effective 
number, there are potentially more resources 
available for candidates to finance their campaigns. 
The second variable has to do with the economic 
development of each electoral district, as measured 
by GDP per capita. As the object of analysis here is 
the 2010 election for federal deputy, the electoral 
districts are the Brazilian states.
The hypothesis tested here is that the impact on 
votes of the resources raised by candidates is linked 
to the competitiveness and economic development 
of the electoral districts. In more economically 
developed states (as measured by GDP per capita) 
and states with a higher number of candidates, 
financial resources would have less of an effect on 
votes. However, in states with a lower per capita 
income and fewer candidates, the correlation 
between votes and financial resources would tend 
to increase. The idea is that in poorer states with 
fewer candidates, the effects of the monetization 
of campaigns would be different from what would 
occur in richer states with a higher number of 
candidates for a federal deputy’s seat.
For this purpose, we propose an index that 
controls the effects of monetization on campaigns. 
Here, the term “monetized campaigns” is used 
as a measurement for identifying the effects of 
monetary resources on electoral performance. The 
proposal includes the construction of an index that 
groups the twenty-seven Brazilian electoral districts 
into four categories: i) The least monetized (MeM), 
in electoral districts with low GDP per capita and 
fewer effective candidates; ii) Limited Monetization 
due to Economic Scarcity (MLiE), for districts with 
low GDP per capita but a higher ratio of effective 
Figure 3- Representation of r2 by electoral district for the relationship between campaign resources and votes for federal deputy in 2010.
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candidates; iii) Limited Monetization due to political 
scarcity, where the GDP per capita is high but the 
proportion of candidates is low; and iv) The Most 
Monetized (MaM), for districts with high GDP per 
capita and a high proportion of candidates.
Two sources provide information for the tests, both 
available on the website of the Supreme Electoral 
Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE). The first is 
the performance of candidates for federal deputy 
in 2010; the other is candidate accountability. As 
the information from the two databases needs to 
be cross-referenced, only candidates who received 
votes and accounted for their campaign donations 
and expenditure during the campaign were taken 
into consideration. As a result, a total of 4,124 cases 
were included in the study. Information was also 
obtained from the Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics (IBGE) concerning the composition of 
GDP per capita for each state in 2008.
The remainder of this paper is divided into three 
parts. The first includes the variables and the 
model for creating the campaign monetization 
index using two variables: one political (effective 
proportion of candidates); and one economic (GDP 
per capita for each state). The index is then tested 
for candidates for federal deputy for each state in 
2010. Finally, some conclusions are given regarding 
the “findings”.
2. Composition of the campaign 
monetization index
As stated above, the monetization index is 
composed of two variables from different 
dimensions and macro-coverage. One is political, 
measured in terms of the proportion of candidates 
in relation to the possible maximum. The other is 
economic, measured in Brazilian reais to show GDP 
per capita per electoral district for election to federal 
deputy. With this information in hand, we intend to 
establish a regional and non-individual pattern that 
enables a comparison of the effects of resources 
between districts with different characteristics. The 
composition of the values of these two variables 
results in what is referred to here as the monetization 
index, composed of four categories to monitor the 
effects of resources per number of candidates and 
the wealth of the electoral district. There now follow 
the stages for calculating this index.
2.1 – Weighting by the proportion of effective 
candidates
First of all, it is necessary to find the weighted 
number of effective candidates per electoral 
district. This is because the more candidates there 
are, the more “expensive” the available money for 
campaign finance becomes. The limited number of 
candidates per district is defined by the number of 
seats that each district is entitled to in the Chamber 
of Deputies. Therefore, the closer the number of 
candidates is to the maximum number permitted, 
the greater the demand for resources in that district 
to finance campaigns4.
Law 9504/97 establishes the maximum number of 
candidates in each district. For federal deputy, the 
following criteria are used: in districts with up to 
twenty seats in the Chamber of Deputies, parties 
that are not part of a coalition can field up to twice 
the number of seats, while coalitions, irrespective 
of the number of parties involved, can field up to 
2.5 times the number of seats. For example, in a 
district with a minimum number of eight seats in 
congress, each non-coalition party can field up 
to sixteen candidates, while each coalition can 
field up to twenty. In electoral districts with over 
twenty seats, a party that is not part of a coalition 
can field up to 1.5 times the number of seats and 
each coalition can field up to twice the number of 
candidates. Therefore, in a district with thirty seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies, a “lone” party can field 
up to forty-five candidates, while each coalition 
can field up to sixty. According to these rules, the 
number of candidates for federal deputy in Brazil 
per electoral district varies in accordance with three 
main factors:
- Number of parties fielding candidates: the more 
parties, the higher the number of candidates;
- Number of coalitions: although coalitions may 
field 50% more candidates, when there is a large 
number of parties in a coalition, there is an opposite 
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effect, reducing the number of candidates in each 
party that makes up the coalition;
- Effective number of candidates per party and/
or coalition: current legislation sets a maximum 
number of candidates but not a minimum. 
Therefore, in theory, parties can field as many 
candidates as they want up to the legal limit.
The calculation to arrive at the effective proportion 
of candidates is simple:
Where:
EPC = Effective Proportion of Candidates in the 
electoral district;
RNC = Real Number of Candidates;
PNC = Possible Number of Candidates.
If in an electoral district the effective number of 
candidates were the same as the maximum, the 
proportion would be 1 (one), i.e., 100% of the 
candidatures for candidates for federal deputy 
would be taken. For the federal elections of 2010, 
the TSE registered 102 party coalitions in the 
twenty-seven electoral districts, totaling 128 lists 
with different compositions. In accordance with the 
legislation and the number of parties and coalitions 
running for office in 2010, if they had all fielded the 
maximum number, there would have been 9,243 
candidates. However, the number of candidates 
that actually ran for office was 4,124, which means a 
total proportion of 0.44. In other words, the political 
parties fielded less than half the total number of 
candidates that they were entitled to field in 2010. 
This proportion of 0.44 is the nationwide median. 
However, there were differences in the proportions 
of effective candidates for each electoral district5. 
Table 1 shows the number of effective candidates 
for each electoral district, the maximum number of 
candidates and the proportion. The table shows the 
proportion of candidates in descending order.
Tocantins had the highest proportion of candidates 
(0.93), with 37 out of a maximum of 40. The district 
with the lowest proportion of candidates was 
Ceará. With 22 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
considering the number of parties and coalitions 
in the 2010 election, Ceará could have fielded 
up to 357 candidates, but only 82 were actually 
registered, an effective proportion of 0.23. If all the 
electoral districts had the same level of economic 
development, in Tocantins there would potentially 
be fewer resources available for each individual 
candidate than in Ceará, where the proportion of 
candidates was approximately five times lower.
The proportion of effective candidates is the first 
component of the monetization index. However, 
on its own it is not enough to equate candidates 
by financial resources, unless all the districts had 
the same level of economic development and as 
a result had the same amounts of resources for 
election campaigns. As this is not the case in Brazil, 
where there are high levels of macroeconomic 
inequality from one region to another, it is also 
necessary to weight the availability of resources for 
election campaigns in terms of GDP per capita.
2.2 Weighting GDP per capita in electoral districts 
The aim here is to place more emphasis on the less 
economically developed districts. This is because 
in richer districts there is greater monetization of 
election campaigns in absolute terms. 
To arrive at the proportion of wealth in electoral 
districts, the district with the lowest GDP per capita 
is used as a parameter (value 1). All the other 
districts will be inversely proportionate to it. In 
2008, according to the IBGE, Piauí had the lowest 
GDP per capita in Brazil, at R$5,372.56. The formula 
for the proportion is:
Where:
PGdp = Proportion of GDP per capita in relation to 
Piauí;
GDP_PI = GDP per capita for Piauí in 2008;
GDP_ed = GDP per capita of the electoral district 
in 2008.
As GDP per capita in Maranhão is only 12% higher 
than that of Piauí, the weighting for this district is 
0.88. However, in the case of the Distrito Federal, 
the highest GDP per capita in Brazil in 2008, the 
difference is almost ten times higher and the 
proportion is only 0.12. This means that in the 
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Distrito Federal for each absolute real value of 
an election campaign, the relative value in Piauí 
would be almost ten times that of the two districts 
with proportionally the same effective number of 
candidates.
By multiplying the weighted value by the total 
resources raised by the candidates, the result is 
a sum of resources that can be compared from 
district to district. Thus, the absolute differences 
in funds raised by districts with different levels of 
economic development would be cancelled out by 
this multiplication. 
The value of funds raised by the candidates from 
a given electoral district can be compared with 
candidates from other districts with different levels 
of economic development. If all the districts had 
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the same proportion of candidates for the election, 
it would only be necessary to multiply the weighted 
value in Table 2 by the individual funds raised in 
order to compare all the candidates. However, as we 
have seen in Table 1, this would not be adequate.
The equation may be represented as:
Where:
FPde = Funds raised in proportion to the wealth of 
the electoral district;
PGDP = Proportion of GDP per capita in relation to 
Piauí;
TotF = Total individual funds as declared to the TSE.
Since not all the electoral districts had the same 
proportion of candidates, it is also necessary 
to weight the proportional funds raised by the 
effective proportion of candidates. This is done by 
multiplying the value of FRed by the PEC of each 
district, thus:
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Where:
RWW = Resources weighted by regional wealth and 
proportion of candidates;
FPed = Funds raised in proportion to the wealth of 
the electoral district;
EPC = Effective Proportion of Candidates in the 
electoral district;
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By weighting the proportion of candidates and 
the proportion of wealth, the individual values of 
funds raised by the candidates are adjusted. As the 
indicators are inverted, we hope to obtain a median 
value between the proportion of candidates and 
the wealth of the electoral district. The indicator 
is inverted because in relation to GDP per capita 
the greatest weights lie in the poorest electoral 
districts, whereas when it comes to the indicator for 
effective candidates, the greatest weight lies in the 
districts with the highest proportion of candidates. 
The result of this is that there is compensation 
between availability of resources and candidates 
in each district. From a theoretical viewpoint, if the 
maximum number of candidates were fielded in 
the richest district, it would lie at the heart of the 
distribution: in 14th place in the ranking of states.
Table 3, above, shows the percentage differences 
between the median values of funds raised by 
candidates according to electoral district and the 
weighted values for GDP per capita and the effective 
number of candidates. According to the table, 
Tocantins showed the least difference between 
the original median of funds raised per federal 
deputy, the weighted value for GDP per capita and 
the effective number of candidates. The median 
weighted funds accounted for 72.8% of the original 
median. The greatest median difference was that 
of the Distrito Federal, where the weighted value 
represented only 29.85% of the median declared 
funds raised for the election campaigns.
The final step for verifying the effectiveness of 
the monetization index is to determine whether 
the weightings had no significant effect on the 
relationship between campaign finance and votes. 
If the coefficient of determination varies a great 
deal in relation to the original, this means that the 
index is artificially biased. If the all-in result of the 
coefficient of determination of the weighted values 
is close to the original, the explanatory model 
remains adjusted, even after weighting. Using 
the variables transformed into logarithms of the 
nominal voting and the weighting of values by GDP 
and effective candidates (RWW), the r2 of 0.698 is 
therefore practically the same as shown in Figure 1 
(r2 of 0.700). With this result, we can now move on 
and propose a typology for the types of election for 
federal deputy with the controlled monetization of 
campaigns, which will be seen in the next section.
Considering the two variables for weighting 
the effects of campaign finance, we propose a 
categorization. First of all, we will divide them into 
two groups, using the median of the proportion 
of effective candidates: below the median, 0.490, 
electoral districts with low numbers of candidates 
and, above the median, districts with a higher 
proportion of candidates. Following the same 
logic for the economic variable, we will divide 
them into two equal groups, using the median 
of 0.450 of the proportion of GDP per capita, 
with the more economically developed districts 
(below the median) and the less developed ones 
(above the median)6. By combining the groups of 
binary variables, we create a new categorization 
that considers both the political and economic 
dimensions jointly, as shown in Chart 1, below. The 
distribution of electoral districts in 2010 regarding 
campaign financing with controlled monetization 
may be shown as it follows. 
With the categories defined, from here on tests 
will be conducted to gauge the performance of 
the candidates in each type of electoral district 
and degree of campaign finance. We begin by 
testing the differences between the money raised 
by candidates and the number of votes gained by 
type of election. When gauging the difference in 
the proportion of finance per vote among those 
who were and were not elected, we can see a 
concentration of resources on more electorally 
viable candidates for each type of district. The 
greater the difference, the more financing is 
concentrated on candidates who are most likely 
to win. The lower the difference, the more equality 
there is in the distribution of campaign finance.
When analyzing the different medians of reais 
per vote among the elected and unelected (Table 
4), we see that votes are cheaper for the elected 
candidates in all categories. However, in districts 
with less monetization (MeM), the distance 
between them is greater. Those who were not 
elected had on average 82.33% more reais per 
vote than those who were elected, with R$ 6.56 
over R$ 3.60. The second largest difference is in 
more monetized districts (MaM), with an average 
of 39.92% more reais per vote for the unelected 
over the elected. Then come the districts with 
3. A typology for comparing 
electoral districts in Brazil
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limited monetization due to political scarcity, with 
a difference of 29.94%. Finally, there are the districts 
with monetization limited by economic scarcity, 
with a difference of 14.61%. These results show that 
where there are fewer resources available and fewer 
candidates, donations tend to be concentrated on 
the campaigns of candidates who are more likely to 
be elected. Proportionally, the average difference 
of the less monetized ones is twice as high as 
the difference of the more monetized, coming in 
second place in terms of concentration of resources 
on candidates who are more likely to be elected. 
The ANOVA test of the differences in means 
between elected and unelected candidates by 
categories of monetization shows that the mean 
differences among the unelected are statistically 
significant. Therefore they are strong for the 
relationship among almost all the categories, 
except less monetized disputes (MeM) and those 
of monetization limited by political scarcity 
(MLiP). This means that among the total number 
of candidates, the differences are significant for 
almost all the categories. Nevertheless, when 
looking at the median differences of the elected 
candidates, we see that the only statistically 
significant strong differences are among 
candidates from less monetized districts (MeM) in 
relation to the others. The other three categories of 
elected candidates showed no significant median 
differences (highlighted in red in Table 4). This 
means that whereas for the unelected the level of 
monetization of the electoral district matters when 
it comes to the R$/vote ratio, but for the elected 
candidates, it does not. 
These results show that in situations of economic 
and political scarcity (low GDP and high effective 
proportion of candidates) there is a drop in the 
financial values necessary for candidates to win 
votes. Less money and fewer candidates mean 
that the campaign finance of elected candidates is 
similar to that of the unelected. However, the lowest 
general difference, unlike what one would imagine, 
is not between MeM and MLiE but is actually the 
difference between MeM and MLiP. This means that 
in districts with limited candidates, the volumes of 
resources are lower than in districts with economic 
limitations, i.e., the campaigns are more egalitarian 
in terms of finance when there are fewer candidates 
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than in an electoral district with less wealth. In 
other words, although there is economic wealth in 
the district, campaign donations are limited by the 
low number of candidates. This limitation is greater 
than that found in districts were levels of wealth are 
low but the proportion of candidates is high (MLiP).
Having conducted analyses on the impact of 
financial resources on votes, we now move on to test 
the index with three individual variables: i) origin of 
the candidate and whether he/she is a professional 
politician; ii) the gender of the candidate; and iii) 
the candidate’s type of party coalition. In all cases, 
the results are divided by all the candidates and 
then only by the elected candidates to see whether 
there are behavioral differences between all the 
candidates and the elected candidates7. 
Table 5 shows the relationship between categories 
of monetization and whether the candidate is a 
professional politician for all candidates and then 
only those who were elected. When we consider 
the whole set of candidates, there are no significant 
differences in terms of whether the politician is 
a professional in any of the categories. All the 
residuals lay between ±1.96 and the q2 is 4.031. 
When only elected candidates are considered, there 
is a concentration of significant negative residuals 
(-2.4) for non-professional politicians in elections 
with limited monetization and political scarcity. 
There are also significant positive residuals (2.1) 
in the same category. This raises the q2 to 13.459, 
making it statistically significant. The interpretation 
of this distribution is that there are more likely to 
be professional politicians in districts with a low 
effective number of candidates, i.e., districts with 
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a lower proportion of candidates tended to elect 
more professional politicians to the Chamber of 
Deputies in 2010.
The second variable tested here is gender, in 
order to identify whether women tend to be 
concentrated in a certain monetization category. 
Unlike the previous variable, Table 6 shows that 
the q2 coefficients are significant for all candidates 
and those who were elected, with coefficients of 
20.308 and 12.080, respectively. This means that at 
least one of the residuals of each group was over 
the critical limit. We can see that the significant 
residuals (in red in Table 6) are for women, both 
among all candidates and those who were elected. 
This means that in the case of men, the candidate 
distribution, irrespective of whether they are 
elected, is not concentrated in any of the categories 
of monetization.
In the case of women, among all the candidates 
there is a significant negative trend (-3.1) in less 
monetized campaigns and a significant positive 
trend in more monetized campaigns (2.0). This 
means that in more economically developed 
districts with a higher proportion of candidates, 
more women tend to be involved. The presence 
of women in districts with a higher proportion of 
candidates was to be expected because, owing to 
the gender quotas, the more women there are, the 
higher the proportion of candidates there can be. 
However, in less economically developed districts 
there are fewer women than expected among the 
candidates. This means that economic development 
played a positive role in the involvement of women 
in the 2010 campaign for federal deputy.
Nevertheless, the fact that there are more female 
candidates in economically developed districts 
does not mean that they will be more successful 
and win elections. On the contrary, the standardized 
residuals for the elected candidates show that the 
only category with a significant residual for women 
was that of monetization limited by economic 
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scarcity (MLiE), with a coefficient of 2.8. This 
means that elected female candidates tended to 
be concentrated in districts with a high number 
of effective candidates, but with low economic 
development. In other words, although in richer 
districts there is a higher proportion of female 
candidates, these women tend to do better in 
districts with low monetization as a result of 
economic limitations. 
The next variable is strictly political. It identifies 
the relationship between candidates’ performance 
by type of coalition. It is based on the assumption 
that parties that form a coalition with the party that 
won the presidential election, the PT, have specific 
characteristics by type of monetization. If the 
hypothesis of dependence on the State and a link 
between votes and economic satisfaction is correct, 
poorer districts will tend to elect more candidates 
from the PT or parties that form a coalition with 
it. For this purpose, the candidates were placed 
in three groups: i) in coalitions without the PT for 
parties that decided to form coalitions, irrespective 
of being opponents of the PT; ii) a coalition with the 
PT for candidates from parties that joined forces 
with the PT or PT candidates that joined forces with 
other parties; and iii) the PT with no coalition, for 
candidates in districts where the PT opted not to 
join forces with any other party.
Table 7 shows that the coefficients of the q2 test 
were higher than those of the previous variables. 
The q2 for all the candidates was 139.347 (0.000), 
and for the elected candidates it was 79.765 (0.000). 
This shows that at least one of the relationships 
between the categories of all the candidates and 
those who were elected was over the critical limit.
If we consider the results for the set of candidates, 
the districts with lower monetization tended to 
field less candidates in coalitions without the PT 
(-2.6) and fewer candidates from the PT without 
a coalition (-2.5). In these same districts, we tend 
to see more candidates in coalitions with the PT 
(7.9). In districts with limited monetization due to 
economic scarcity, the only significant and positive 
residual is that of candidates in coalitions with the 
PT (4.1). In the more monetized districts, the positive 
residuals are for candidates in coalitions without 
the participation of the PT (2.0) and the negative 
residuals are for candidates in coalitions with the 
PT (-6.0). These results allow us to affirm that in 
poorer districts with a lower proportion of effective 
candidates there is a tendency to concentrate 
candidates in coalitions with the ruling party. In 
more developed districts with a higher proportion 
of candidates, there is a tendency for candidates to 
join parties that are not in a partnership with the PT.
In the case of elected candidates, the residuals 
are closer to those found for the whole set of 
candidates. As shown in Table 7, above, in less 
monetized districts there is a lower proportion 
of candidates in non-PT coalitions (-3.5) and 
candidates from the PT without a coalition (-2.0). 
Candidates belonging to parties in coalitions with 
the PT or who were PT candidates in coalitions 
were concentrated among the elected candidates 
in these districts (5.4). The standardized residuals 
of districts with monetization limited by economic 
scarcity were low, indicating no relationship. 
Districts with monetization limited by political 
scarcity showed significant negative residuals for 
parties in coalitions with the PT (-2.1) and positive 
REB. REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS BRASILEÑOS   I   PRIMER SEMESTRE 2015   I   VOLUMEN 2 - NÚMERO 2
77
  EFFECTIVE NUMBERS OF CANDIDATES AND REGIONAL WEALTH IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE ANALYSES  
for PT candidates without a coalition (3.7). In 
more monetized districts, the positive significant 
residuals were for candidates in non-PT coalitions 
(2.3) and the negative residuals were for parties in 
coalitions with the PT (-3.1).
We can tentatively state that elections in less 
economically developed districts with a low 
proportion of candidates tend to benefit the 
governing party and its political allies (parties 
in coalitions with the PT). In these districts 
candidates who are not in a coalition with the PT 
are less likely to be elected. On the other hand, 
in more economically developed districts with a 
higher proportion of candidates, parties that are 
not working with the PT tend to fare better and 
candidates linked to the governing party tend not 
to be elected.
4. Concluding Notes
As Brazil is such a large country, no matter how 
much its electoral laws attempt to establish a 
single formula for all electoral districts, regional 
aspects and other local factors must be taken into 
account when making a comparative analysis of 
the political indicators. This is even more important 
when the analysis has to do with campaign finance 
and how financial resources are turned into 
votes. Analyses using nationwide data regarding 
campaign financing that do not take regional 
differences into account run a high risk of reaching 
distorted and reckless conclusions. If we consider 
only the object of study here, the 2010 federal 
deputy elections, and look at two variables in this 
context, i.e., the economic and the political aspects, 
we see significant differences.
From an economic viewpoint, the district with 
the highest GDP per capita, the Distrito Federal, 
enjoyed a GDP per capita in 2008 that was almost 
ten times higher than that of the district with the 
lowest index, Piauí. This difference alone is an 
indication of the scarcity of resources for campaigns 
in Piauí in comparison with the Distrito Federal, 
and this means that it is necessary to weight the 
“value of money” in election campaigns under such 
different economic conditions. In addition to the 
availability of money on the “market”, we also have 
to consider the candidates competing for these 
resources. The higher the proportion of candidates, 
the more hotly disputed these resources will be. In 
2010, on average, 44% of the possible candidacies 
were filled, in accordance with the electoral laws of 
the day. If all the districts had the same proportion 
of candidates this would not be a problem. The 
point in question is that the proportion of effective 
candidates varies greatly. In the elections for the 
Chamber of Deputies in 2010, the electoral district 
with the highest proportion of candidates in 
relation to the maximum number permitted was 
Tocantins, with 0.93, and the lowest proportion was 
Ceará, with 0.23.
Because of the regional inequalities in both 
political and economic terms, an effort has been 
made here to categorize the elections according to 
the degree of monetization of each district, taking 
into account the GDP per capita and effective 
proportion of candidates. In this way it was possible 
to categorize Less Monetized districts (MeM), 
where there is little wealth and a lower proportion 
of effective candidates. It was also possible to 
categorize the More Monetized districts (MaM), 
with high levels of wealth and a higher proportion 
of effective candidates. Between these two poles, 
there are other categories: Monetization Limited 
by Economic Scarcity (MLiE), for districts with low 
economic wealth but a high proportion of effective 
candidates; and Monetization Limited by Political 
Scarcity (MLiP), with high levels of economic wealth 
but a low proportion of effective candidates.
Tests concerning the impact of financial resources 
on campaigns proved that they were very similar 
for the crude model but had economic and 
political differences when weighted. The regression 
between the total votes and campaign funds raised 
showed an r2 of 0.394 without weighting and an r2 
of 0.386 after being weighted by the two variables, 
indicating very similar adjustments in both cases. 
However, the Beta (β) coefficient of the weighted 
model was slightly higher than that of the model 
prior to weighting, with β=0.132 and β=0.056, 
respectively.
With the indicator showing that the impact 
of individual campaign finance is sensitive to 
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weighting by regional wealth and proportion of 
candidates, we conducted tests to identify possible 
electoral performance patterns of candidates 
according to other variables. The first had to do 
with the difference in the reais/votes ratio for 
elected and unelected candidates in the four 
campaign monetization categories. This test found 
(Table 4) that elected candidates won more votes 
for each real raised in all districts. Nevertheless, 
the difference is greater in Less Monetized 
districts, with an average difference in excess of 
80%. In other words, to receive a vote, a defeated 
candidate in a Less Monetized district requires 1.8 
times more resources than an elected candidate. 
The proportional difference in More Monetized 
(MaM) districts was just over 40%. Districts with 
Monetization Limited by Political Scarcity (MLiP) 
had the lowest differences between elected 
and defeated candidates in terms of converting 
financial resources into votes. In other words, the 
more candidates running for office, the more equal 
the financial conditions between the elected and 
unelected, irrespective of regional wealth.
The second variable measured the performance 
of candidates who are professional politicians, the 
other candidates and the type of monetization 
of their campaigns. When all the candidates are 
considered, it is impossible to find standardized 
residuals above the critical limit, which indicates 
that the distribution is close to what is expected 
when there is no relationship between the two 
variables. However, when only elected candidates 
are considered (see Table 5), in districts with 
Monetization Limited by Political Scarcity (MLiP) 
there is a lower proportion of professional politicians 
among the unelected and a higher proportion 
among the elected. This means that although in 
the other types of election being or not being a 
professional politician makes no difference when it 
comes to being elected, in conditions of economic 
wealth and a low proportion of candidates, career 
politicians tend to fare better. 
When considering the relationship between the 
gender of the candidate and the type of campaign, 
men are equally spread in all the categories, both 
in terms of total candidates and those who are 
elected. Women have some statistically significant 
residuals. Table 6 shows that when all female 
candidates are taken into consideration, women 
tend to dispute elections less in Less Monetized 
(MeM) districts and run for office more when the 
district is More Monetized (MaM). However, this is 
not reflected in their electoral success. When only 
elected female candidates are considered, the 
only strong and positive result is in districts with 
Monetization Limited by Economic scarcity (MLiE), 
i.e., women are more successful in districts with low 
levels of economic development but which have 
a high proportion of effective candidates. In other 
words, women ran for office in 2010 in electoral 
districts with a developed economy, but tended 
to be elected in less wealthy districts, albeit with a 
high proportion of candidates.
The final variable to be tested here is political and 
has to do with how close ties to the governing 
party, the PT, affect the performance of candidates 
by type of campaign finance. The candidates 
were organized into three groups: parties that 
formed coalitions without the PT, including both 
single parties and coalitions formed without the 
governing party, indicating independence from 
or opposition to the PT; parties in a coalition with 
the PT, indicating closeness to the governing party; 
and the PT without any coalitions, for PT candidates 
that entered the election without joining or forming 
a coalition with another party. The results (see 
Table 7) show a relationship between economic/
political development, the fielding of candidates 
and their rate of success. Parties in coalitions with 
the PT tend to elect more candidates in districts 
that are Less Monetized (MeM) and elect fewer 
candidates in More Monetized (MaM) districts. 
The opposite occurs with candidates from parties 
that are not in a coalition with the PT. There is a 
significant and negative coefficient for elections in 
MeM districts and a positive one in MaM districts 
for opposition parties. However, when we consider 
the relationships for all the candidates, we see that 
performances are similar. Parties in coalitions with 
the PT tend to field more candidates in MeM districts 
and parties not in a coalition with the PT field fewer 
candidates in these districts. Therefore, the “vote 
for the government” in poorer districts is directly 
related to the organization of candidatures by the 
political elite. As the opposition and independent 
parties field fewer candidates in districts with low 
monetization, coalitions with the governing party 
tend to enjoy higher success rates in these regions. 
The results shown here are not intended to be 
definitive, seeing that it is an analysis of a single 
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election campaign for the Chamber of Deputies 
in 2010. Nevertheless, two main points have 
been proved: i) the need to regard the impact 
of financial resources on election campaigns 
when intending to make comparative analyses or 
use data at the national level; ii) weighting only 
using economic variables may be insufficient to 
explain the differences between Brazilian electoral 
districts. What proved to be more adequate was 
joint weighting between economic development 
(measured by GDP per capita) and the development 
of political competitiveness (measured by the 
proportion of effective candidates) to gauge 
the impact of financial resources on election 
campaigns.
 
NOTES
1 There are at least two major ongoing lines of research into 
campaign finance in Brazil. One of these will be the object 
of this study and analyzes the effect of money on votes. The 
other looks at financing from the viewpoint of the donors and 
their characteristics, in accordance with the approach taken 
by researchers such as Speck and Mancuso (2011).
2 Logarithms in a regression were used owing to the high level 
of heteroscedasticity perceived in the relationship between 
the original variables.
3 A preliminary version of this part of the analysis was 
presented at a round table meeting on Brazilian elections at 
the 6th Latin-American Congress on Political Science, held in 
Quito, Ecuador, in June 2012.
4 For a more in-depth discussion on this point, see: CERVI, 
Emerson. Comportamiento electoral y nivel de disputa en 
Brasil. Presented at the Simposio del Grupo de Investigación 
«Comunicación Política y Comportamiento Electoral”. 6th 
Latin-American Political Science Congress, Alacip, Quito – 
Ecuador, 2012.
5 It is important to mention that one of the factors that limits 
the capacity of parties to field the maximum number of 
candidates is the rule that establishes a quota of at least 30% 
of candidates of the same gender and a maximum of 70%, 
as determined by Article 10 of law 9504/97. As parties and 
coalitions cannot usually find enough women to run for 30% 
of the vacancies, the solution is to reduce the total number of 
candidates in order to comply with the rule. Therefore, even 
though there may be more men willing to run, the parties 
will limit the number of candidates due to a lack of female 
candidates. For instance, say that a party can field up to thirty 
candidates for federal deputy. In this case it would need to 
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field at least ten candidates of the same gender. Should it 
manage to field only seven women (or men), there could not 
be more than twenty-one candidates of the opposite sex. 
Consequently, the number of effective candidates would 
fall to twenty-eight, two fewer than the maximum number 
permitted by law. 
6 Thus, it is inverted, as we opted to leave the least developed 
electoral districts closer to the maximum value, which is 1, 
for Piauí.
7 In order to demonstrate these differences, the standardized 
residuals that indicate the concentration of cases in the 
categories will be analyzed. As all the tests have a confidence 
interval of 95%, the critical limit for the standardized value of 
an expected distribution is up to ±1.96. Any residual above this 
limit, either positive or negative, indicates a greater number 
of cases than would be expected when comparing real 
distribution with theoretical distribution. The q2 coefficients 
for all the relationships are also presented, although it is 
known beforehand that it will only be statistically significant if 
there is any residual above the critical limit of ±1.96.
